The optimal risk allocation problem or equivalently the problem of risk sharing is the problem to allocate a risk in an optimal way to n traders endowed with risk measures 1 , . . . , n . This problem has a long history in mathematical economics and insurance. In the first part of the paper we review some mathematical tools and discuss their applications to various problems on risk measures related to the allocation problem like to monotonicity properties of optimal allocations, to optimal investment problems or to an appropriate definition of the conditional value at risk. We then consider the risk allocation problem for convex risk measures i . In general the optimal risk allocation problem is well defined only under an equilibrium condition. This condition can be characterized by the existence of a common scenario measure. We formulate a meaningful modification of the optimal risk allocation problem also for markets without assuming the equilibrium condition and characterize optimal solutions. The basic idea is to restrict the class of admissible allocations in a proper way.
Introduction
The optimal risk allocation problem or equivalently the problem of optimal risk sharing has a long history in mathematical economics and insurance and is of considerable practical and theoretical interest. In early papers the construction of linear reinsurance treaties has been based on minimizing the individual and the aggregate variance of risk (for references see Seal (1969) ). Borch (1960a Borch ( , 1960b Borch ( , 1962 showed that based on utility functions Pareto optimal risk exchanges can be characterized and in many cases lead to familiar linear quota-sharing of the total pooled losses or to stop loss contracts and to mixtures of both. Solutions are however typically not uniquely determined which may lead to substantial fixed side payments. In several papers authors have added game theoretic considerations or additional concepts (like the concept of fairness) to arrive at a specific element in the set of Pareto optimal rules (see Borch (1960b) , Lemaire (1977) , Bühlmann and Jewell (1979) ).
Since risk pools redistribute only actual losses and possibly the associated premiums but not the individual wealth of the company it is natural to include side constraints in the exchange protocol of the form Y i ≥ A i for the components Y i of the allocation and some constant or random bounds A i , to limit negative charges or payouts of company i. Similarly also upper constraints of the form Y i ≤ A i + B i have been introduced to protect the liquidity of the individual companies. The importance of side constraints has been suggested by Borch (1968) and has formally been introduced and applied in Gerber (1978 Gerber ( , 1979 .
Several authors have extended the framework to include the presence of background risk and have considered the allocation problem also in the context of financial risks (see Leland (1980) , Chavallier and Müller (1994) , and Barrieu and El Karoui (2002a , 2002b , 2004 , Dana and Scarsini (2005) , Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000) , Arrow (1963) , Gerber (1979) , Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) , Denault (2001) , Dana and Meilijson (2003) , Heath and Ku (2004) , Carlier and Dana (2003) , , Jouini, Schachermayer, and Touzi (2005) , Dana (2005) and references therein). Also more general types of risk measures (distortion type, coherent, convex, comonotone risk measures) have been considered for the allocation problem. For the background literature on risk measures and their applications to finance and insurance we refer to Kaas, Goovaerts, Dhaene, and Denuit (2001) , Delbaen (2002) , and Föllmer and Schied (2004) .
In our paper which is based on these developments we consider the following formulation of the optimal risk allocation problem. Let (Ω, A, P ) be a nonatomic probability space and consider a market whith n traders endowed with convex risk measures 1 , . . . , n . The problem is to characterize optimal allocations of a risk X ∈ L ∞ (P ) to the n traders, i.e. to determine solutions of the problem
under all allocations of X to the traders, i.e. under all decompositions
(The same problem can also be considered in L p (P ) for any 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞.) Solutions of the risk allocation problem are not unique but in fact are given under an equilibrium condition by the set of all Pareto optimal allocations, as follows from a general separation argument and the translation invariance of the i (see Gerber (1979, pg. 88-96) . Thus the optimal allocation problem can be interpreted as problem to minimize the total risk of a risk sharing contract but also as a basic tool to determine Pareto optimal allocations. The value of the optimal allocation problem is given by the infimal convolution
In the first part of the paper we show that the general formulation of the optimal risk allocation problem in (1.1) (1.2) makes only sense under a Pareto equilibrium condition (E). In vague form (E) can be stated as follows. A market is in equilibrium if in a balance of supply and demand it is not possible to lower the risk of some traders without increasing that of some other traders. This equilibrium condition (E) has been characterized for coherent risk measures 1 , . . . , n in Heath and Ku (2004) and in in terms of the scenario measures of the i . We give an extension of this characterization to convex risk measures and establish that is a convex risk measure if and only if the Pareto equilibrium condition (E) holds true.
The main new part of this paper is concerned with the allocation problem in the case that the equilibrium condition does not hold. In this case the above formulation of the optimal allocation problem leads to inconsistencies. We introduce a new class of restrictions on the set of allocations which we call admissible allocations and consider the problem of optimal allocations with respect to this restricted class. In comparison to the constraints as dealt with in Gerber (1978) we postulate constraints on the compensation structure of the allocation X i motivated as above to limit negative charges or payouts and to protect the liquidity. The bounds depend on the absolute size of the total risk X. From a mathematical point of view our side constraints are connected with a similar idea in portfolio theory, where one considers (lower bounded) admissible strategies in order to exclude strategies which allow arbitrage. As consequence we obtain a new convex risk measure -called the convex admissible infimal convolution risk measure -which describes the optimal total admissible risk
The risk sharing problem is a problem where the traders minimize the total risk by some kind of exchange contracts. This can be considered as an optimistic attitude towards risk. It aims to construct an optimal admissible exchange which is typical for insurance and reinsurance contracts. In the final part of our paper we consider the opposite view from the perspective of a regulatory agent in a financial market who takes care that the individual agents (traders) have enough capital reserves to cover their part of the risk X i in any allocation X = n i=1 X i to the n traders. The regulatory agent considers any possible (admissible) allocation and determines the total risk in the worst case which is the necessary total capital reserve. Therefore, we describe this situation as a situation with a cautious risk attitude. Again as a result we obtain a new coherent risk measure describing the worst case total admissible risk.
In section 2 of this paper we review some mathematical tools and in particular discuss the relevance of the generalized distribution transform as well as the Hoeffding-Fréchet bounds and the comonotone improvement result for various risk measure problems. These are in particular useful tools for establishing natural monotonicity properties of optimal allocations. They also simplify arguments for optimal investment problems and lead in a natural way to a correct definition of the conditional value at risk measure. In section 3 we then consider the optimal allocation problem which corresponds to an optimistic risk attitude. In section 4 we discuss the allocation problem under a cautious risk attitude, i.e. under the view of a regulatory agent. In both cases as a result we obtain convex risk measures which are relevant and correspond to the risk attitude.
This section deals with some mathematical tools which are useful for deriving monotonicity properties of optimal allocations but also are useful for various further problems on risk measures. We assume throughout this paper that the underlying probability space (Ω, A, P ) is nonatomic.
For any real random variable X on Ω let for x ∈ IR and λ ∈ [0, 1]
be the modified distribution function. For a random variable V uniformly distributed on (0, 1) (V ∼ U (0, 1)) and independent of X (which we assume to exist on (Ω, A, P )) we define the (generalized) distribution transform of X by
Then it is not difficult to check that
and
The generalized distribution transform in (2.2) can be found in Ferguson (1967, Lemma 1, p. 216 ). An extension of this transform to multivariate random vectors is in Rüschendorf (1981) . (2.2), (2.4) gives an explicit construction for a result of Ryff (1970) , which states the existence of some U ∼ U (0, 1) with (2.4). We will give some examples of the usefulness of this distribution transform. A second tool of considerable importance are the Hoeffding-Fréchet bounds (holding true also without assuming (Ω, A, P ) to be nonatomic): For any X, Y such that X · Y ∈ L 1 (P ) and any U ∼ U (0, 1) holds
Hoeffding-Fréchet bounds
Remark 2.1 Inequality (2.5) is due to Hoeffding (1940) . The related bounds for the joint distribution functions are given independently at the same time by Fréchet (1940) . Using the above mentioned result of Ryff (1970) the Hoeffding-Fréchet bounds (2.5) also follow from rearrangement inequalities for real functions on [0, 1] due to Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952) . The literature on rearrangement inequalities in function spaces making this connection to random variables however came up only in the 70's and, therefore, it seems appropriate to assign this fundamental inequality to Hoeffding and Fréchet. A third important tool in connection with the allocation problem is the following comonotone improvement result of Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) 
Here ≤ cx denotes the convex stochastic ordering and
i.e. all components are similarly ordered. Comonotonicity of (X * i ) is known to be equivalent to the existence of nondecreasing functions Proof: For a) see Föllmer and Schied (2004) , Rüschendorf (2004), and Dana (2005) .
Therefore, using convexity of on sets of comonotone risks and ≤ cxconsistency of we obtain (αX
In case is comonotone additive and coherent part b) follows from Wang, Young, and Panjer (1997) . As consequence of the comonotone improvement result we thus obtain Proposition 2.3 (Monotonicity result) Let i be convex, law invariant risk measures and let
It is obvious that this result also holds true for risk measures on L p (P ), 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. The monotone improvement result implies the existence of optimal allocations (X * i ), such that X * i = f i (X), f i nondecreasing (see Carlier and Dana (2003) , Jouini, Schachermayer, and Touzi (2005, Theorem 6 )) provided the infimum over all allocations is finite, i are convex law invariant and X ∈ L ∞ (P ). The same monotone structure of optimal solutions remains true if we add an individual rationality constraint to the problem, i.e.: Let X = n i=1 X i be an allocation of X and consider the problem We discuss briefly some further interesting applications of these tools relevant in risk theory.
I. Copulas
Then applying the generalized distribution transform to the components
with uniform marginals. Further,
(2.10) and the d.f. F X of X is given by
Thus U is a copula of X. The generalized distribution transform allows a simple construction of the copula which is an important tool for the analysis of the dependence structure of risk vectors. Thus Sklar's theorem is a direct consequence of the generalized distribution transform. For the application of the distributional transform to obtain bounds for risk functionals of portfolio vectors see the survey paper Rüschendorf (2005) .
II. Conditional value at risk
Let x α = g α (X) = inf{x : P (X ≤ x) ≥ α} denote the lower α-quantile of the risk X. It is well known that the conditional tail expectation
in general does not define a coherent risk measure except when restricted to continuous distributions. From the point of view of the generalized distributional transform it is natural to define the conditional value at risk by
where U = F (X, V ) ∼ U (0, 1) is the distribution transform of X. With this definition we obtain
14)
The modified definition of conditional value at risk is identical to the expected shortfall ES α (X); it therefore is also identical to the average value at risk AVaR α (X), and thus is a coherent risk measure. As a result the definition of conditional value at risk in (2.13) appears to be appropriate and leads to a coherent risk measure.
III. Optimal investment problem
The following optimal investment problem is a classical problem in portfolio theory (see Dana (2005) with many references on this problem).
For
Considering X as a price density the problem is to find under all investments C which are more attractive than X one with the lowest price. The solution e(X, X ) of (E) is called reservation price of X (see Jouini and Kallal (2000) ). Its value is given by e(X, X ) =
(see also Dana (2005, Theorem 1) ). The proof of the following lemma, which is crucial for this problem, is simplified by the general distribution transform.
Lemma 2.4 For any r.v.s X, Y holds
Proof: By the Hoeffding-Fréchet inequality the r.h.s of (2.16) is a lower bound. Conversely, let V ∼ U (0, 1) be independent of X and define U := F X (X, V ). Then 
Now (2.15) follows from the monotonicity of e(·, X ) with respect to ≤ cx , which is a well known result in stochastic ordering. Note that the optimal investment C * is given by
IV. Minimal liability risk problem
The following minimal liability risk problem of Schied (2004) is similar to the optimal investment problem in III: 17) where is a law invariant risk measure and ϕ is a pricing density 0 ≤ ϕ, E P ϕ = 1. The aim is to minimize the risk of the liability −X under all X with price of −X smaller than −v.
There exists a solution X * of (L) as shown in Schied (2004) 
Proof:
a) Let V ∼ U (0, 1) be independent of X, ϕ and let U ϕ := F ϕ (ϕ, V ) ∼ U (0, 1) be the generalized distributional transform and
, where X is a solution of (2.17).
Then X ∼ X * and thus (− X) = (−X * ). Further, using
* is a solution and X * = h(ϕ, V ), where h is monotonically nondecreasing in ϕ, V . Thus X * , ϕ are comonotone.
b) If is a convex law invariant risk measure, and if we define
then we obtain EϕX = EϕX * ≥ v and (−X) ≤ (−X * ) = (− X), since is ≤ cxconsistent. Thus we obtain a solution which is a monotonically nondecreasing function of ϕ. 2
Optimal allocation of risks with optimistic risk attitude
In this and in the following section we assume that i are convex risk measures on L ∞ (P ), i.e. monotone, translation invariant convex functionals on L ∞ (P ). The acceptance set A = A of a convex risk measure is given by the convex set
Convex risk measures are characterized by a representation of the form (X) = sup
where ba(P ) is the set of finitely additive P -continuous measures and α : ba(P ) → (−∞, ∞] is a convex penalty function, which can be chosen as Fenchel-Legendre conjugate of
(see Föllmer and Schied (2004) ). Further the sup can be restricted to the class M 1 (P ) of probability measures absolutely continuous w.r.t. P if the acceptance set (3.4) or equivalently if is Fatou continuous (i.e. |X n | ≤ K, ∀n and X n P → X implies (X) ≤ lim (X n )) resp., if is lower semicontinuous w.r.t. σ(L ∞ (P ), L 1 (P )). We will introduce a meaningful general formulation of the optimal allocation problem and derive some properties of optimal allocations. It was observed in the case of coherent risk measures i in Heath and Ku (2004) and that the optimal allocation problem as in (2.1) is well defined only under an additional Pareto equilibrium condition. This observation extends to the case of convex risk measures i with penalty functions α i as in (3.3). 
In a balance of supply and demand the market is in Pareto equilibrium not possible to lower the risk of some traders without increasing that of others. Vaguely one could say that there is no arbitrage situation concerning risk. There is a seemingly stronger version of the equilibrium condition:
It is immediate to see that (SE) ⇒ (E), but in fact both conditions are equivalent.
Proposition 3.2 The equilibria conditions (E) and (SE) are equivalent.
Proof: Assume that for some X i ∈ L ∞ (P ) with
Thus we obtain a contradiction to (E). 2
Thus under the Pareto equilibrium condition (E) the sum of all risks in a balance situation is greater than the cumulative risk of zero. The infimal convolution = 1 ∧ · · ·∧ n as defined in (1.2) describes the optimal allocation of risk. itself is, as a functional of X, a risk measure.
If is a convex risk measure, then by Theorem 3.6 in the penalty function α b of is given by
A characterization of Pareto equilibrium is given in the following proposition in terms of the penalty functions α i .
Proposition 3.3 Let
Then the following conditions are equivalent.
1) is a convex risk measure.
2) (0) > −∞.
The first equivalence is obvious. The equivalence of 1) and 3) follows from the fact that the penalty function α b of is given by
The equivalence of 3) and 4) follows from the definition of since
i.e. to condition (SE).
The equivalence of 2) and 5) is obvious. 2
Remark 3.4 In the case of coherent risk measures i , α i (Q) ∈ {0, ∞} for all i and the sets P i = {Q ∈ ba(P ), α i (Q) = 0} defined in Proposition 3.3 are identical with the sets of scenario measures of i . Thus Proposition 3.3 implies the characterization of Heath and Ku (2004) resp. in this case. The equilibrium condition (E) is equivalent to the condition
there exists a scenario measure Q which is shared by all traders in the market.
In the case that the Pareto equilibrium condition does not hold we introduce the following formulation of the optimal allocation problem which makes sense also without assuming condition (E).
Define a decomposition X = n i=1 X i to be admissible if X(ω) ≥ 0 implies that 0 ≤ X i (ω) and X(ω) ≤ 0 implies that X i (ω) ≤ 0. Let A(X) denote the set of admissible decompositions (X i ) of X. We define the admissible infimal convolution * as the value of the allocation problem restricted to admissible allocations * (X) := inf
(3.5)
Obviously, we have
The restriction to admissible decompositions of risks excludes, similarly as the restriction to admissible strategies in portfolio theory, that effects like doubling strategies paradoxes may occur in risk allocation.
In the following theorem we derive a representation of * in terms of the representation scenarios P i := {Q ∈ ba(P ); α i (Q) < ∞} of i . For P i ∈ P i define by P 1 ∧ · · · ∧ P n the lattice infimum of (P i ) in the lattice ba(P ) and by P 1 ∨ · · · ∨ P n the lattice supremum of (P i ) in ba(P ) (see Rao and Rao (1983, Theorem 2.2 .1)). If P i are probability measures with densities f i w.r.t. µ then P 1 ∧ · · · ∧ P n resp. P 1 ∨ · · · ∨ P n have densities min{f i } resp. max{f i } w.r.t. µ.
Theorem 3.5 Let j be convex risk measures with penalty functions α j . The admissible infimal convolution * is given by * (X) = sup
The proof is similar to that for coherent risk measures in . The class of admissible decompositions has an alternative description like in multiple decision problems:
thus we consider decompositions of the form (ϕ i X).
Therefore, we obtain * (X) = inf
We now apply the minimax theorem for games (A, B, f ) of concave-convex type, (see Müller (1971) ). Let f : A × B → IR, A, B = Ø and assume that
If f < ∞ and if for some topology τ on A holds A is τ -compact and
, which is compact in weak * -topology,
. By linearity of f and convexity of P i and A the conditions of the minimax theorem are fulfilled and we obtain from the first part of the proof * (X) = − inf
As consequence of Theorem 3.5 we obtain a further characterization of the Pareto equilibrium condition (E) and under condition (E) the identity of and * . Therefore, the representation of (3.6) holds true for under condition (E). Proof: The first equivalence is obvious since the condition * (1) = * (0) − 1 implies translation invariance of * . By Theorem 3.5
Thus * (1) = * (0) − 1 if and only if there exists a common scenario measure Q ∈ n i=1 P i which by Proposition 3.3 is equivalent to the equilibrium condition (E). 
As we have seen the modified allocation problem given by * leads to a senseful version of the allocation problem also when (E) does not hold. We finally get by a modification of * a convex risk measure * which we call convex admissible infimal convolution. 2) Under condition (E) holds * = .
Proof:
1) This follows from the definition of * .
2) Under condition (E) * is a convex risk measure by Proposition 3.6. Therefore * = * = by 1). 2
Risk allocation with cautious risk attitude
In this section we take an opposite regulatory point of view on risk allocation corresponding to a cautious risk attitude. The natural allocation problem then is given by the supremal convolution τ (X) := sup
where i are convex risk measures. It turns out however, that except in the trivial situation where P 1 = P 2 = · · · = P n = {P 1 } we do not get by (4.1) a convex risk measure. As in section 3 it seems natural to restrict the class of decompositions. Let 
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 3.5 we obtain τ * (X) = sup and thus τ * (1) = i (0) − 1 ⇔ P i = 1, ∀P i ∈ P i (4.6) ⇔ P 1 = P 2 = · · · = P n and |P i | = 1.
As in section 3 we obtain from the modified allocation problem a meaningful convex risk measure.
We define the convex admissible supremal convolution risk measure τ * by τ * (X) = inf{m ∈ IR; X + m ∈ A τ * } = inf{m ∈ IR; τ * (X + m) ≤ 0}, (4.7)
where A τ * = {X ∈ L ∞ (P ); τ * (X) ≤ 0}. Then we obtain Proposition 4.3 The convex admissible supremal convolution risk measure τ * is the largest coherent risk measure such that
The admissibility of a decomposition seems to be a natural postulate. Thus the admissible supremal convolution risk measure offers a solution to the risk measure problem for markets under a cautious attitude towards risk.
